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Abstract—Federated Learning (FL) is a promising machine
learning paradigm that enables the analyzer to train a model
without collecting users’ raw data. To ensure users’ privacy, dif-
ferentially private federated learning has been intensively studied.
The existing works are mainly based on the curator model or local
model of differential privacy. However, both of them have pros
and cons. The curator model allows greater accuracy but requires
a trusted analyzer. In the local model where users randomize local
data before sending them to the analyzer, a trusted analyzer is not
required but the accuracy is limited. In this work, by leveraging
the privacy amplification effect in the recently proposed shuffle
model of differential privacy, we achieve the best of two worlds,
i.e., accuracy in the curator model and strong privacy without
relying on any trusted party. We first propose an FL framework
in the shuffle model and a simple protocol (SS-Simple) extended
from existing work. We find that SS-Simple only provides an
insufficient privacy amplification effect in FL since the dimension
of the model parameter is quite large. To solve this challenge,
we propose an enhanced protocol (SS-Double) to increase the
privacy amplification effect by subsampling. Furthermore, for
boosting the utility when the model size is greater than the user
population, we propose an advanced protocol (SS-Topk) with
gradient sparsification techniques. We also provide theoretical
analysis and numerical evaluations of the privacy amplification
of the proposed protocols. Experiments on real-world datasets
validate that SS-Topk improves the testing accuracy by 60.7%
than the local model based FL. We highlight the observation that
SS-Topk even can improve by 33.94% accuracy than the curator
model based FL without any trusted party. Compared with non-
private FL, our protocol SS-Topk only lose 1.48% accuracy under
(4.696, 10−5)-DP.
INTRODUCTION
Federated Learning (FL) [1] is a promising machine learn-
ing paradigm that enables the analyzer to train a central model
without collecting users’ raw data but only local updates.
However, it has been shown that sharing raw local updates
may compromise users’ privacy [2], [3], [4]. To this end, dif-
ferentially private federated learning has been wildly studied
to provide formal privacy. The existing works are mainly based
on the curator model (DP) or local model (LDP) of differential
privacy. The curator model based FL (DP-FL) [5], [6] allows
better learning accuracy but relies on a trusted analyzer to
collect raw local updates. The local model based FL (LDP-FL)
[7] preserves strong local privacy since the users randomize
local updates before sending them to an untrusted analyzer; but
it suffers a low utility. Specifically, for a basic bit summation
task over n users with privacy budget 1, the error of DP can
achieve O(1/); whereas, the error of LDP is bounded by
Ω(
√
n) [8].
The recently proposed secure shuffle model (SS) can
achieve the best of two worlds, i.e., accuracy in the curator
model and strong privacy in the local model. The shuffle model
introduces a shuffler sitting between users and the analyzer
(as shown in Figure 1(b)) permutes the locally randomized
data from users before sending them to the analyzer. The
accuracy gain of the shuffle model is obtained from the privacy
amplification effect [9], which indicates that the shuffled (i.e.,
anonymized) outputs of local randomizers provide a stronger
(amplified) privacy in the central view of differential privacy
than the one without a shuffler. Accordingly, less local noise
is needed in the shuffle model to preserve the same level of
privacy against the untrusted analyzer.
However, it is not clear how to employ the shuffle model
in federated learning. Although a few works have investigated
basic tasks such as the bit/real summation [10] and histogram
[11], the existing protocols may not be viable for the multi-
dimensional aggregation FL.
The dimension of the update vector aggravates the error
caused by local noises with a dimensional factor [8]. More-
over, since the number of users participating in one iteration
is typically a few thousands, the aggregation escalates into
a high-dimensional task. We solve the above challenges by
making the following contributions:
• For the first time, we propose FLAME, a federated
learning framework in the shuffle model such that the
users enjoy strong privacy and the analyzer enjoys the
accuracy of the model. We first formalize our privacy goal
in FLAME by clarifying trust boundary and a fine-grained
trust separation (Table I), then we propose SS-Simple
protocol by extending a one-dimensional task [10].
We find that, although the privacy amplification is achiev-
able by SS-Simple, the magnitude of amplification di-
minishes with the dimension size of the local updates
(Corollary 2).
• To alleviate this challenge, we propose SS-Double proto-
col to enhance the privacy amplification by subsampling.
As we notice that the amplification by subsampling
may not be composable with shuffling, we propose a
1A larger privacy budget leads to better utility and less privacy.
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Fig. 1: Trust boundaries in the curator, shuffle and local model of differential privacy. The curator model relies on a trusted
analyzer. Users in the local model or the shuffle model do not need to trust any external parties and thus preserve strong
privacy.
novel dummy padding method to bridge two kinds of
amplification effects with formal proofs (Theorems 3 and
4). We demonstrate that the protocol SS-Double enjoys
dozens times privacy amplification comparing with the
protocol SS-Simple (Figure 3).
• A problem of SS-Double protocol is that the random
subsampling treats all dimensions equally and thus may
discard “important” dimensions. To further boost the
utility in a high-dimensional case, we design an advanced
protocol called SS-Topk, which is based on the idea of
gradient sparsification. A challenge is that the indexes
of Top-k elements in the local update vector may reveal
sensitive information to the shuffler since the selection
is data-dependent. We quantify this privacy threat by
formalizing index privacy and design a method to flexibly
trade off between index privacy and utility. We note that
the index privacy will not impair the privacy guarantee
against the analyzer.
• Finally, we conduct experiments on the real-world dataset
to validate the effectiveness of the proposed protocols. It
turns out that the proposed double amplification effect in
SS-Double and private dimension selection in SS-Topk
significantly improve the learning accuracy. We observe
a 33.94% accuracy improvement of SS-Topk than the
curator model based FL without relying on any trusted
party. Compared with non-private FL, SS-Topk only lose
1.48% accuracy under (4.696, 10−5)-DP.
PRELIMINARIES
We present the necessary background of our work and defer
more details about related works to the appendix. We also list
major notations used in the paper in the appendix.
The Curator and Local Models
In the curator model, a trusted analyzer collects users’ raw
data (e.g local updates) and executes private mechanism to
ensure differentially private outputs. The privacy goal is to
achieve indistinguishability for any outputs w.r.t. two neigh-
boring datasets which differ by replacing one user’s data,
denoted as X 'r X ′. We have the following definition:
Definition 1: [Differential Privacy (DP)] A mechanismM :
Xn → Z satisfies (, δ)-differentially privacy if for any two
neighboring datasets X 'r X ′ ∈ Xn and any subsets S ⊆ Z,
Pr[M(X) ∈ S] ≤ e Pr[M(X ′) ∈ S] + δ.
However, the curator model assumes the availability of a
trusted analyzer to collect raw data. Local differential privacy
in Definition 2 does not rely on any trusted party because
users send randomized data to the server. If R satisfies (, δ)-
LDP, observing collected results (y1, · · · , yn) or its summation
implies (, δ)-DP [12].
Definition 2: [Local Differential Privacy (LDP)] A
mechanism R : X → Y satisfies (, δ)-locally differentially
private if for any two inputs x, x′ ∈ X and any output y ∈ Y,
Pr[R(x) = y] ≤ e Pr[R(x′) = y] + δ.
The Shuffle Model
The protocol of a shuffle model consists of three compo-
nents: P = A ◦ S ◦ Rn, as shown in Figure 1(b). Existing
works [13], [11], [14], [15], [16] focus on the basic task where
each user holds a one-dimensional data x ∈ X. We denote n
users’ data as the dataset X = (x1, · · · , xn) ∈ Xn. Each user
runs a randomizer R : X → Ym to perturb the local data
into m messages that satisfy l-LDP. W.o.l.g. we focus on the
single-message protocol where m = 1. The shuffler executes
S : Y∗ → Y∗ with a uniformly random permutation pi over
received messages. The analyzing function A : Y∗ → Z takes
the shuffled messages as input and outputs the analyzing result.
The privacy goal in shuffle model is to ensureM = S ◦Rn
satisfies (c, δc)-DP, because A is executed by an untrusted
analyzer, which is not obliged to protect users’ privacy. By
the post-processing property [12], the protocol P achieves the
same privacy level as M. Hence, we focus on analyzing the
indistinguishability forM(X) andM(X ′). [9] proved that the
privacy of M can be “amplified”. In other words, when each
user applies the local privacy budget l in R, M can achieve
a stronger privacy of (c, δc)-DP with c < l. Compared with
the local model, the shuffle model needs less noise to achieve
the same privacy level.
Among existing works, the privacy blanket [10] provides an
optimal amplification bound for the single-message protocol.
The analyzing intuition is to linearly decompose the output
distribution into a real data distribution and a uniform random
“privacy blanket” distribution. γ denotes the probability for R
to output an element from the blanket distribution. With the
local randomizer Rγ,b in Algorithm 1, where γ = bel+b−1 ,
the input value x is encoded into a discrete domain [b] and
then randomized. After S runs a permutation, A aggregates
shuffled results zˆ ← 1b
∑n
i=i yi and de-bias with
z ← (zˆ − nγ/2)/(1− γ). (1)
The privacy amplification bound for Algorithm 1 is shown in
Lemma 1 and the effect for generic randomizer is distilled in
Corollary 1. For a randomizer with Laplace Mechanism on
the domain [0, 1], γ = e−l/2. A tighter bound (i.e., a greater
amplification) can be accessed with numerical evaluations.
Algorithm 1 Rγ,b : [0, 1]→ [b] [10]
Input: input scalar x ∈ [0, 1]
Output: perturbed value y ∈ [b]
1: x¯← bxbc+ Ber(xb− bxbc)
2: Sample r ← Ber(γ)
3: y =
{
x¯ if r = 0,
Unif({1, · · · , b}) else.
Lemma 1: [10] For
√
14 log(2/δc)(b−1)
n−1 < c ≤ 1, if Rγ,b
satisfies l-LDP, we have (c, δc) for S ◦ Rn, where c =√
14 log(2/δc)(e
l+b−1)
n−1 .
Corollary 1: [10] In the shuffle model, if R is l-LDP,
where l ≤ log(n/log(1/δc))/2.M satisfies (c, δc)-DP with:
c = O((1 ∧ l)el
√
log(1/δc)/n).
Composition and Subsampling Properties.
The composition properties [17] are generic for both the
curator and the local model of differential privacy.
Lemma 2: ∀, δ ≥ 0, t ∈ N, the family of -DP mechanism
satisfies t-DP under t-fold adaptive composition.
Lemma 3: ∀, δ, δ′ > 0, t ∈ N, the family of (, δ)-DP
mechanism satisfies (
√
2t ln(1/δ′)·+t·(e−1), kδ+δ′)-DP
under t-fold adaptive composition.
A mechanism K that randomly subsamples elements without
replacement from a database leads to a privacy amplification
by subsampling in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4: [Privacy Amplification by Subsampling] [18]
If M : Xm → Y satisfies (, δ)-DP with respect to the
replacement relationship 'r on sets of size m, M′ : Xn → Y
satisfies (log(1 + (m/n)(e − 1)), (m/n)δ)-DP.
FLAME FRAMEWORK
In this section, we formalize the framework of Federated
Learning in the Shuffle Model, which we call FLAME.
…
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Fig. 2: FLAME: Federated Learning in the Shuffle Model.
TABLE I: Separation of Trust between Shuffler and Analyzer.
Parties
Shuffler S Analyzer A Observer O
gradient vector ID gradient vector ID query modelindex value index value
DP-FL N/A
√ √
(c, δc)-DPLDP-FL (c, δc)-LDP
√
FLAME × × √ (c, δc)-DP ×√
: trusted, ×: untrusted.
Parties.: We present the FLAME architecture in Figure
2 with three parties: 1) n users, each of which owns a d-
dimensional local update vector xi and runs a local randomizer
R with output yi. 2) The shuffler S, the server who can
perfectly shuffle received messages and send them to the
analyzer. 3) The analyzer A, the server that estimate the mean
of shuffled messages into z and updates the global model at
round t by θt ← θt−1 + z.
Trust Boundaries.: We first clarify the trust boundary in
FLAME. We denote the observer as O which could be any
curious party who can observe the global model parameters.
In the curator model (DP-FL), the trust boundary lies between
A and O. In the local model (LDP-FL), the trust boundary
lies between each individual user and the rest parties. By
introducing a shuffler S, FLAME avoids placing full trust in
any single party as DP-FL and meanwhile be able to achieve
better utility than LDP-FL.
Trust Separation.: Further, we clarify what are the pri-
vate information and who can touch them in our framework
FLAME. We design a fine-grained scheme of trust separation
for FLAME and compare with DP-FL and LDP-FL in Table I.
Specifically, we separate the information of each local update
into: the indexes, the values of the corresponding indexes and
the user identity (i.e., ID in Figure 2). It should be noted that
the indexes could be sensitive when the indexes are selected
and sent to the shuffler S in a value-dependent manner. Thus,
our privacy goal in FLAME is to make the indexes are selected
in an data-oblivious way and the true values of gradients are
invisible to S. But S should know users’ implicit identity in
order to distribute global model parameters and receive local
messages. The shuffled messages from S do not reveal the
user identity and satisfy (c, δc)-DP against A. For O, (c, δc)-
DP holds by the post-processing property [12]. In LDP-FL, a
(c, δc)-LDP R is required by each user for this goal.
FLAME framework.: We present the our framework in
Algorithm 2 with three building processes: encoding E , shuf-
fling S and analyzing A. In Line 8, C is the threshold for
clipping the vector. We denotes the local privacy budget for
each local vector by l. We use pka and ska to represent
the public and secret key held by the analyzer, respectively.
Different protocols below are designed by implement functions
Randomize(·) in Line 10 and Shuffle(·) in Line 15 with
different strategies. It should be noted thatRγ,b in Algorithm 1
can be applied in Randomize(·) as a basic randomizer, which
accords to estimating with equation (1) for line (18). Generic
randomizers (e.g. Laplace Mechanism) can also be applied,
which does not affect our theorems later.
Security Assumptions.: We assume that the shuffler and the
analyzer are not colluded (otherwise, FLAME is reduced to
LDP-FL). We also assume that the cryptographic primitives
are safe and adversaries have computational difficulty to learn
any information from the cipher text.
Simple Protocol (SS-Simple).: We first propose SS-Simple
P = A ◦ S ◦ Rn for d-dimensional aggregation under
the FLAME framework. In a nutshell, we extend the one-
dimensional protocol [10] by conducting its randomization
and aggregation for each dimension. With the composition
property in Lemma 2, R should satisfy ld-LDP, where
ld = l/d. We instantiate Randomize(·) in Algorithm
2 for SS-Simple with idxi ← {1, · · · , d} and yi ←
{Rld(xi,1), · · · ,Rld(xi,d)}. The function Shuffle(·) simply
generates a permutation pi and outputs mpi(i)∈[n].
Then we account for the central DP that it holds against
the analyzer. Take ld to Lemma 1 for Rγ,b or other numer-
ical evaluations for generic R, an amplified central privacy
(cd, δcd) can be derived. With the composition in Lemma 3,
we can easily derive the vector-level composition in Theorem
1. Corollary 2 distills the amplification from l to c.
Theorem 1: For any neighboring datasets X 'r X ′ which
differ in one user’s d-dimensional local vector, M = S ◦ Rn
in SS-Simple satisfies (c, δc)-DP, where:
c = dcd ∧ (cd
√
2d log(1/δcd) + dcd(e
cd − 1)), (2)
δc = δcd(d+ 1). (3)
Corollary 2: For SS-Simple, with l ≤ d · log(n/ log((d +
1)/δc))/2, the amplified central privacy is c = O((1 ∧
el/d)el/d log(d/δc)
√
d/n).
Limitation of SS-Simple.: Observing the Corollary 2, we
find that the central DP level depends on the dimension d.
Intuitively, from the view of privacy, the amplification effect
is diminished with a large d. From the view of utility, ran-
domizing the value yi,j for each dimension with a negligible
privacy budget ld = l/d will inject large noises.
DOUBLE AMPLIFICATION (SS-DOUBLE)
Intuition.: For strengthening the privacy amplification ef-
fect, we propose an improved protocol SS-Double. Instead of
perturbing every dimension with a small ld = l/d, we only
sample and perturb k dimensions k  d. As a result, each
dimension can benefit from a larger privacy budget lk = l/k.
Algorithm 2 FLAME: Encoding, Shuffling, Analyzing.
Input: A,S, E , n, T, l, pka, ska
Output: θT
1: Analyzer publishes pka
2: for each iteration t = 1, · · · , T do
3: Analyzer sends θt−1 to Shuffler
4: Shuffler distributes θt−1 to a batch of n users
5: for each user i ∈ [n] do
6: xi ← LocalUpdate(θt−1)
7: B Encoding E by each user
8: x¯i ← Clip(xi,−C,C)
9: x˜i ← (x¯i + C)/(2C)
10: 〈idxi, yi〉 ← Randomize(x˜i, l)
11: ci ← Encpka(yi)
12: user i sends mi = 〈idxi, ci〉 to Shuffler
13: end for
14: B Shuffling S by the Shuffler
15: Shuffler sends Shuffle(mi∈[n]) to Analyzer
16: B Analyzing A by the Analyzer
17: decrypts values ypi(i)∈[n] ← Decska(cpi(i)∈[n])
18: estimates mean z¯ ← 1
n
∑
i∈[n]〈idxi, yi〉
19: normalizes z ← C · (2z¯ − 1)
20: updates model θt ← θt−1 + z.
21: end for
Furthermore, we notice that the privacy amplification can
be further magnified by subsampling, which we call the
double amplification. Intuitively, if the privacy amplification
is strengthened, we could inject fewer noises under the same
central privacy level.
Challenge.: However, the privacy amplification by subsam-
pling may not be composable with shuffling due to multi-
dimensional vectors. We first show how to compose the
privacy amplification of shuffling and subsampling in one
dimension with Rγ,b. Suppose Kβr samples ns users from
n users with β = ns/n. The shuffler only receives encoded
message from sampled users. Applying Lemma 1 and Lemma
4, we derive Theorem 2. In addition, we should ensure
δcd < 2β for a positive logarithm, which is reasonable to
achieve since δcd  1dn is negligible by standard.
Theorem 2: With γ = beld+b−1 and δcd < 2β, M = S ◦
Rnsγ,b ◦ Kβr satisfies (cd, δcd)-DP, where:
cd = log(1 + β(e
√
14 log(
2β
δcd
)(elk+b−1)
ns−1 − 1)) (4)
However, we cannot derive a similar theorem with Rγ,b in
a multi-dimensional case. Intuitively, it is because the proof
of privacy amplification by shuffling relies on bounded-size
neighboring datasets, while subsampling may lead to two
neighboring datasets with distinct size. Due to space limitation,
we elaborate this with a formal proof in Appendix.
Dummy Padding.: To solve the composition issue, we
propose the method of dummy padding: let the shuffler pad
each dimension into the same size of np. Denote the number
of padding values for one dimension as nn = np−ns, and nn
elements of R(0) are shuffled with all other messages received
from users. Thus, the SS-Double is P = A ◦ Sp ◦ Rnp ◦ Kβr ,
where Sp consists of padding and shuffling by the shuffler and
Kβr denotes randomly subsampling by each user. To instantiate
Algorithm 3 Shuffle(·)=Sp for SS-Double
1: for j ∈ [d] do
2: ns,j ←∑ni |{r|r ∈ idxi, r = j}|
3: nn,j ← np − ns,j
4: end for
5: the number of dummy vectors v ←∑dj ns,j/k
6: for u ∈ [v] do
7: Sdummy ← {j|nn,j 6= 0}
8: idxn+u ← {j|j ∈ Sdummy}k
9: yn+u ← {R(0)}k
10: mn+u ← 〈idxn+u,Encpka(yn+u)〉
11: end for
12: generates a permutation pi over [nl + v]
13: shuffles and sends {mpi(1), · · · ,mpi(nl+v)} to analyzer
SS-Double in our framework, the Randomize(·) works as
follows. First, it randomly samples k indexes idxi ← Kβr (d).
For each index j ∈ idxi, the perturbed value in yi is
yi,j ← Rld(x˜i,j). The procedures of Shuffle(·) in FLAME
are listed in Algorithm 3.
Privacy and Utility Analysis.: We show the overall privacy
amplification bound for Rγ,b in Theorem 3. We notice that
a larger np leads to a smaller cd, which implies a greater
privacy amplification. Correspondingly, a larger np implies
more noises injected as shown in Proposition 1.
Theorem 3: With γ = belk+b−1 and σcd < 2β, M = Sp ◦
Rnpγ,b ◦ Kβr satisfies (cd, δcd)-DP, where:
ck =
√
14 log( 2βδcd )(e
lk + b− 1)
np − 1 , (5)
cd = log(1 + β(e
ck − 1)). (6)
Proposition 1: The standard deviation of the estimated
mean in each dimension from P = A ◦ Sp ◦ Rnp ◦ Kβr is
O(
n1/6p log
1/3(1/δck)
ns
2/3
ck
).
Since all dimension-level datasets are padded into the same
size and (ck, δck)-DP holds from the amplification in Theo-
rem 3, we show the vector-level DP composition in Theorem
4. The sample rate is denoted as β = k/d. We distill the
amplification effect from l to c in Corollary 3
Theorem 4: For any neighboring datasets X 'r X ′ which
differ in one user’s local vector, the d-dimensional vector
aggregation protocolM = Sp◦Rβ◦Kβr in SS-Double satisfies
(c, δc)-DP, where:
c = 2βdcd ∧ (cd
√
4βd log(1/δcd) + 2βdcd(e
cd − 1)),
δc = δcd(2βd+ 1).
Corollary 3: For SS-Double, with l ≤
βd log(np/ log((2β
2d + β)/δc))/2, the amplified central
privacy is:
c = O((1 ∧ e
l
βd )e
l
βd β1.5
√
d
np
log(
βd
δc
) log(
β2d
δc
)). (7)
Simulation of Privacy Amplification.: To compare the pri-
vacy amplification effect of SS-Simple and SS-Double, we
visualize the magnified privacy w.r.t. Rγ,b in Figure 3.
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Fig. 3: Privacy amplification effect comparison.
1) S ◦ Rn (SS-Simple): Lemma 1 and Theorem 1.
2) Sp ◦Rnp ◦Kβr (SS-Double): Theorem 3 and Theorem 4.
To align the valid condition in Lemma 1, we compare the
above two cases given the same local privacy budget for each
perturbed dimension, denoted as ld for SS-Simple and lk for
SS-Double. In this case, we present the amplification effect
by the magnification ratio l/c for d = 75632. It can be
observed that the double amplification of SS-Double boosts
improves the ratio from ×2.55 to ×137.27, which denotes a
stronger privacy amplification effect. It should be noted that
for other randomizers except for Rγ,b, double amplification in
Theorem 4 still holds, which only differs in the evaluation of
ck. We show more numerical evaluations in experiments.
UTILITY BOOSTING WITH TOP-k (SS-TOPK)
Intuition.: A problem of SS-Double protocol is that the
random subsampling treats all dimensions equally and thus
may discard “important” dimensions. For the high-dimensional
case (d > n), random sampling a small fraction β of values
from a vector slows down the convergence rate of training.
In light of the efficient gradient sparsification technique, we
are motivated to adopt the magnitude-based selection [19]
for boosting the convergence rate. However, selecting Top-
k indexes with greatest absolute magnitudes over the vector
is data-dependent and thus compromise user privacy. The
challenge is how to preserve and qualify the index privacy
while maintaining the utility as far as possible.
Index Privacy.: According to our trust setting in Table I,
the prime adversary that threats index privacy is the shuffler
S because only S knows which user sends which indexes
(note that the perturbed value is encrypted). Our goal is to
bound the shuffler’s success prediction about whether or not
the index uploaded by a user ranks Top-k elements of the local
vector. By random guessing, the adversary’s success rate for
predicting a dimension as Top-k is k/d. After observing the
privatized selected indexes, the success rate cannot be enlarged
by more than ν times.
Thus, we are motivated to qualify and preserve the index
privacy with an anonymity-based metric in Definition 3. We
denote whether the magnitude of dimension j ∈ [d] ranks in
Algorithm 4 Randomize(·)=R ◦ Kβν for SS-Topk
1: Choose a valid l ∈ [max{ 1
νβ
, ν
ν−1+β }, d1/βe]
2: Top-k index set Stop ← {j|j ∈ Top(|x˜i|)}k
3: Non-Top index set Snon ← {j|j ∈ [d]\Stop}k(l−1)
4: for each index j ∈ Stop ∪ Snon do
5: yi,j ←
{
Rlk (x˜i,j), j ∈ Stop
Rlk (0), j ∈ Snon
6: end for
7: generate a permutation pir over [lk]
8: the index list idxi ← {dpir(1), · · · , dpir(lk)}
9: the perturbed value list yi ← {ypir(1), · · · , ypir(lk)}
10: returns 〈idxi, yi〉
Top-k (β = k/d) by Ij ∈ {0, 1}, and whether the index j is
selected by Kβν (j). The first inequality bounds the adversary’s
success rate with ν while the second inequality ensures the
probability is no greater than 1. Intuitively, the strongest index
privacy stands when ν = 1, because observing Kβν (j) does not
increase the adversarial success rate.
Definition 3: A mechanism Kβν provides ν-index privacy for
a d-dimensional vector, if and only if for any j ∈ [d], ν ≥ 1,
we have: Pr[Ij = 1|Kβν (j)] ≤ ν · Pr[Ij = 1] and Pr[Ij =
0|Kβν (j)] ≥ Pr[Ij=0]ν .
To achieve ν-index privacy, we need to control the proba-
bility of Pr[Ij = 1] = β. Given the prior knowledge Pr[Ij =
1] = β,Pr[Ij = 0] = 1−β, if each user reports lk dimensions
to the shuffler of which only k indexes are real Top-k, we have
Pr[Ij = 1|Kβν (j)] = 1l . Put it into the definition, we have:
Pr[Ij = 1|Kβν (j)] ≤ min(ν · β, ν−1+βν ). Thus, Kβν satisfies
ν-top index private when we set l ≥ max{ 1νβ , νν−1+β }.
SS-Topk Protocol.: Denote the SS-Topk protocol as P =
A ◦ Sp ◦ Rnp ◦ Kβν . Each user locally runs R ◦ Kβν . The
shuffler executes Sp. The analyzer runs the aggregation A.
Compared with SS-Double, SS-Topk has the same shuffling
and analyzing procedure but differs in the dimension selection
Kβν in Randomize(·) which is shown in Algorithm 4.
By applying Kβν on the processed vector x˜i, k Top-k indexes
are sampled as the set Stop while k(l−1) non-top dimensions
are randomly sampled from the rest as Snon. As k true value
are perturbed, the privacy budget split for each dimension is
lk = l/k. Then each value of real Top-k dimensions is
perturbed as yi,j ← Rlk(x˜i,j). Each non-top dimension is
padded with value Rlk(0). Then kl dimensions are permuted
into the list of idxi and yi, which will be encrypted as l
messages by Line (11) in Algorithm 2.
Privacy Analysis: First, we show the relationship of ν and
l in Proposition 2 and Figure 4. The strongest index privacy
ν = 1 is achieved when l = d1/βe. For SS-Double, ν naturally
holds with the random sampling mechanism Kβr . To the other
extreme case of no index privacy, SS-Topk still provides a
strong privacy guarantee since the shuffler knows nothing
except for Top-k indexes. An state-of-the-art work [4] has
shown the privacy attack’s availability is significantly impaired
even knowing both Top-k indexes as well as their values.
Proposition 2: The range of ν-top index privacy is 1 ≤ ν ≤
1
β , where the strongest index privacy ν = 1 is achieved when
l = d 1β e and no index privacy is achieved when l = 1.
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Then, we clarify the compatibility of our index privacy
against the shuffler and (c, δc)-DP against the analyzer. With
Sp in Algorithm 3, the analyzer only gets padded results for
each dimension with the same size np. Thus, the ν-index
privacy against the shuffler does not affects the amplified
privacy (c, δc)-DP against the analyzer. SS-Topk shares the
double amplification effect in SS-Double with the same np.
Lastly, we discuss the trade-off between the index privacy
and the communication costs as well as the utility. Given a
desired ν-top index privacy, each user can choose a valid l in
Figure 4 for achieving it. The bandwidth of each user depends
on O(lk). As Proposition 1 implies, the estimation utility
depends on the dummy padding size np. Thus, given np, n
and β, ν does not affect the accuracy of the mean estimation
because the number of dummy values is fixed. We show the
strongest index privacy under given parameters in Theorem 5.
Theorem 5: Given a protocol with Kβν , np, the strongest
index privacy it allows for each user is ν = max{1, 1bnpnβ c·β }.
EVALUATIONS
We evaluate the learning performance on MNIST dataset
and logistic regression model with d = 7850, n = 1000.
Baselines include non-private Federated Averaging (NP-FL)
[1], DP-FL [20] with Gaussian Mechanism in which we
double the sensitivity for the comparision under bounded
DP definition, LDP-FL with Gaussian Mechanism [21] for
(, δ)-LDP and Laplace Mechanism for -LDP and our three
protocols of SS-Simple, SS-Double, SS-Topk. Implementation
details are presented in our appendix.
Comparison of Our Protocols.: For SS-Simple, SS-Double,
SS-Topk, we apply the Laplace Mechanism as the basic
randomizer R for each dimension. Given l = 78.5, the
spilt privacy budget of each dimension is ld = 0.01 for
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SS-Simple and lk = 0.5 for SS-Double and SS-Topk. The
double amplification effect boosts the amplified privacy against
A for one epoch from (0.91, 5 × 10−6)-DP (SS-Simple) to
(0.24, 5 × 10−6)-DP (SS-Double/Topk). Compared with SS-
Simple, SS-Double improves the testing accuracy by 4.07%
under a stronger central privacy. Compared with SS-Double,
SS-Topk significantly boosts the utility by 55.5% under the
same central privacy. With Theorem 5 and n/np = 3 in Figure
5, the maximum index privacy that the protocol allows for each
user is ν = 3.125 with l = 16.
Comparison with DP-FL/LDP.: It is obvious that even the
baseline SS-Simple performs better than LDP-FL. Then we
observe that under the same central privacy (0.24, 5× 10−6)-
DP, SS-Topk even achieves a dramatic higher accuracy than
DP-FL by 33.94%. This is a key observation of our work,
because traditional works for the one-dimensional task claim
that the shuffle model only stands in the middle-ground
between LDP and DP.
We analyze the reasons as follows: 1) The effect of Top-
k: as SS-Double cannot exceed the performance of DP-FL
(0.24, 5×10−6)-DP but SS-Topk can, it is obvious that Top-k
boosts the utility. 2) The effect of the double amplification:
If we only counts the amplification from shuffling for SS-
Topk without the amplification from subsampling, we have
c = 20.53, δc = 5 × 10−6. Hence, we introduce another
baseline of DP-FL (20.53, 5 × 10−6)-DP. We observe that
this line approaches the non-private version and has higher
testing accuracy than SS-Topk1. In other words, SS-Topk
cannot perform better that DP-FL if only amplification of
shuffling is counted. Thus, we validate the effect of proposed
double sampling for such nontrivial utility boosting. Thus, we
conclude that both double amplification and Top-k boosting
are necessary to performs better than DP-FL.
Comparison under variant Parameters.: We then evaluate
the impacts of other hyper-parameters of np, β and privacy
1SS-Topk satisfies (20.53, 5 × 10−6)-DP when ignoring subsampling
amplification effect.
budget l in Figures 6, 7 and 8. 1) It is obvious in Figure 6
that a larger local privacy budget for each dimension leads to
higher testing accuracy. 2) In Figure 7, the higher ratio of n/np
implies less additional noises injected by dummy padding. This
validates our utility analysis in Proposition 1. Thus, we can
conclude that np is the key knob to tune the privacy and utility
trade-off. 3) In Figure 8, we can observe that larger β implies
better utility. With β = 1/10 we can provide (4.696, 10−5)-DP
within 2 epochs and only 1.48% loss compared with NP-FL
in Figure 5.
Privacy Amplification.: We illustrate the overall amplifica-
tion in previous evaluations with the Bennett inequality for the
Laplace Mechanism in Figure 9 and Figure 10. This validate
our Theorems 1, 4 and Corollaries 2, 3 are generic for any local
randomizer, as long as the amplification bound can be derived
by a close-form solution or numerical evaluations [10].
CONCLUSION
To conclude, we propose the first differentially private
federated learning framework FLAME in the shuffle model
for better utility without relying on any trusted server. Our
privacy amplification effect and private Top-k selection mech-
anism significantly boosts the testing accuracy under the high-
dimensional setting.
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